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Predicting Peace: The End of the 
Representation Wars
A Reply to Michael Madary
Andy Clark
Michael Madary’s visionary and incisive commentary brings into clear and pro-
ductive focus some of the deepest, potentially most transformative, implications of
the Predictive Processing (PP) framework. A key thread running through the com-
mentary concerns the active and “organism-relative” nature of the inner states un-
derlying perception and action. In this Reply, I pick up this thread, expanding
upon some additional features that extend and underline Madary’s point. I then
ask, What remains of the bedrock picture of inner states bearing familiar repres-
entational contents? The answer is not clear-cut. I end by suggesting that we
have here moved so far from a once-standard complex of ideas concerning the
nature and role of the inner states underlying perception and action that stale old
debates concerning the existence, nature, and role of “internal representations”
should now be abandoned and peace declared.
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1 Organism-relative content
I’m hugely indebted to Michael Madary for his
visionary  and  incisive  commentary.  The  com-
mentary covers three topics – the nature of per-
ceptual content, the structure of experience, and
some practical implications of the PP (Predictive
Processing) framework. Each one deserves a full-
length paper  in  reply,  but  I  will  restrict  these
brief comments to the first topic – the nature of
perceptual content. Should the PP vision prove
correct,  Madary suggests,  this  would transform
our understanding of the nature and role of per-
ceptual content, with potential consequences for
the larger project of naturalizing mental content.
Driving  such  sweeping  and  radical  reform  is
(Madary argues) the PP emphasis upon the act-
ive contribution of the organism to the generation
of perceptual states. There is an active contribu-
tion, Madary (this collection, section 2) suggests,
insofar as PP depicts perceptual states as “gener-
ated internally and spontaneously by the internal
dynamics of the generative model” (p. 3). 
Such a claim clearly requires careful hand-
ling. For even the most staunchly feedforward
model of perception requires a substantial con-
tribution  from  the  organism.  It  is  thus  the
nature, not the existence, of that contribution
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that  must  make  the  difference.  Elaborating
upon this, Madary notes that ongoing endogen-
ous activity plays a leading role in the PP story.
One might say: the organism’s generative model
(more  on  which  later)  is  already  active,  at-
tempting to predict the incoming sensory flow.
The flow of incoming information is thus rap-
idly flipped into a flow tracking “unexpected sa-
lient deviation”. Identical inputs may thus result
in very different perceptual states as predictions
alter  and  evolve.  An  important  consequence,
highlighted by Madary, is that different histor-
ies  of  interaction  will  thus  result  in  different
perceptual  contents  being  computed  for  the
very  same  inputs.  Different  species,  different
niches,  differences  of  bodily  form,  and  differ-
ences of proximal goals and of personal history
are all thus apt (to varying degrees) to trans-
form what  is  being  predicted,  and  hence  the
contents  properly  delivered  by  the  perceptual
process.
Those contents are further transformed by
a second feature of the PP account: the active
selection of perceptual inputs. For at the most
fundamental level, the PP story does not depict
perception as a process of building a representa-
tion of the external world at all. Instead, it de-
picts perception as just one part of a cohesive
strategy for keeping an organism within a kind
of “window of viability”. To this end the active
organism both predicts and selects the evolving
sensory flow, moving its body and sensory or-
gans so as to expose itself to the sensory stimu-
lations that it predicts. In this way, some of our
predictions act as self-fulfilling prophecies,  en-
abling  us  to  harvest  the  predicted  sensory
streams. These two features (endogenous activ-
ity  and the  self-selection  of  the  sensory flow)
place  PP  just  about  maximally  distant  from
traditional,  passive  “feedforward  hierarchy”
stories. They are rather (as Mike Anderson once
commented to me) the ultimate expression of
the “active perception” program.
Here too, though, we should be careful to
nuance  our story  correctly.  For part  of  main-
taining ourselves in a long-term window of viab-
ility may involve not just seeking out the sens-
ory flows we predict, but the active elicitation
of many that we don’t! PP may, in fact, man-
date all manner of short-term explorations and
self-destabilizations. But such delicacies (though
critically  important-  see  Clark (in press)
chapters 8 and 9) may safely be left for another
day.  The  present  upshot  (Madary this collec-
tion, section 2) is simply that PP, instead of de-
picting perception as a mechanism for revealing
“what is where” in the external world, turns out
to  be  a  mechanism for  engaging  the  external
world in ways that say as much about the or-
ganism (and its own history) as they do about
the world outside. To naturalize intentionality,
then, “all” we need do is display the mechan-
isms by which such ongoing viability-preserving
engagements are enabled, and make intelligible
that such mechanisms can deliver the rich and
varied grip upon the world that we humans en-
joy. This, of course, is exactly what PP sets out
to achieve.
2 Structural coupling and the bringing 
forth of worlds1
Madary notes, more or less in passing, that the
PP vision of “organism-relative perceptual con-
tent” bears a close resemblance to views that
have been defended under the broad banner of
“enactivism”.  I  want to pick  up on this  hint,
and suggest that the PP account actually sets
the scene for peace to be declared between the
once-warring camps of representationalism and
enactivism.  Thus  consider  the  mysterious-
sounding notion of “enacting a world”, as that
notion appears in  Varela et al. (1991)2.  Varela
et al. write that:
The overall concern of an enactive approach
to perception is not to determine how some
perceiver-independent  world  is  to  be  re-
covered; it is, rather, to determine the com-
mon principles  or  lawful  linkages between
sensory and motor systems that explain how
1 Parts of this section condense and draw upon materials from Clark
(in press).
2 There is now a large, and not altogether unified, literature on enac-
tion. For our purposes, however, it will suffice to consider only the
classic statement by Varela et al. (1991). Important contributions to
the larger space of enactivist, and enactivist-inspired, theorizing in-
clude Noë (2004, 2010, this collection), Thompson (2010), and Froese
&  Di  Paolo (2011).  The  edited  volume  by  Stewart et  al. (2010)
provides an excellent window onto much of this larger space.
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action can be perceptually-guided in a per-
ceiver-dependent world. (1991, p. 173)
This kind of relation is described by  Varela et
al. as one of “structural coupling” in which “the
species  brings  forth  and specifies  its  own do-
main of problems” (1991, p. 198) and in that
sense “enacts” or brings forth (1991, p. 205) its
own world. In discussing these matters, Varela
et al. are also concerned to stress that the relev-
ant histories of structural coupling may select
what they describe as  “non-optimal” features,
traits, and behaviors: ones that involve “satis-
ficing” (see Simon 1956) where that means set-
tling  for  whatever  “good  enough”  solution  or
structure  “has  sufficient  integrity  to  persist”
(Varela et al. 1991, p. 196). PP, I will now sug-
gest, has the resources to cash these enactivist
cheques, depicting the organism and the organ-
ism-salient world as bound together in a process
of  mutual  specification  in  which  the  simplest
approximations apt to support a history of vi-
able interaction are the ones that are learnt, se-
lected, and maintained. 
The simplest way in which a PP-style or-
ganism might be said to actively construct its
world is by sampling. Action, as Madary noted,
serves  perception  by  moving  the  body  and
sense-organs around in ways that aim to “serve
up” predicted sequences of high-reliability, task-
relevant information. In this way, different or-
ganisms and individuals may selectively sample
in ways that both actively construct and con-
tinuously  confirm  the  existence  of  different
“worlds”.  It  is  in  this  sense  that,  as  Friston,
Adams, and Montague (Friston et al. 2012, p.
22) comment, our implicit and explicit models
might be said to “create their own data”.3 Fur-
3 Such a process repeats at several organizational scales. Thus we humans do
not merely sample some natural environment. We also structure that envir-
onment by building material artifacts (from homes to highways), creating
cultural practices and institutions, and trading in all manner of symbolic
and notational props, aids, and scaffoldings. Some of our practices and in-
stitutions are also designed to train us to sample our human-built environ-
ment more effectively – examples would include sports practice, training in
the use of specific tools and software, learning to speed-read, and many,
many more. Finally, some of our technological infrastructure is now self-al-
tering in ways that are designed to reduce the load on the predictive agent,
learning from our past behaviors and searches so as to serve up the right
options at the right time. In all these ways, and at all these interacting
scales of space and time, we build and selectively sample the very worlds
that - in iterated bouts of statistically-sensitive interaction - install the gen-
erative models that we bring to bear upon them.
thermore, the PP framework depicts perception
and  action  as  a  single  (neurally  distributed)
process  whose goal  is  the reduction of  salient
prediction-error. To be sure, “sensory” and “mo-
tor” systems specialize in different predictions.
But  the  old  image of  sensory  information  IN
and motor output OUT is here abandoned. In-
stead,  there  is  a  unified  sensorimotor  system
aiming to predict the full range of sensory in-
puts – inputs that are often at least partially
self-selected  and  that  include  exteroceptive,
proprioceptive (action-determining), and intero-
ceptive elements. Nor is it just the sensorimotor
system that is here in play. Instead, the whole
embodied  organism  (as  Madary  notes)  is
treated as a prediction-error minimizing device. 
The  task  of  the  generative  model  in  all
these settings is (as noted in  Clark this collec-
tion)  to  capture  the  simplest  approximations
that will support the actions required to do the
job.  And  that  means  taking  into  account
whatever work can be done by a creature’s mor-
phology,  physical  actions,  and  socio-technolo-
gical  surroundings.  Such  approximations  are
constrained  to  “provide  the  simplest  (most
parsimonious)  explanations  for  sampled  out-
comes”  (Friston et  al. 2012,  p.  22).  This  re-
spects  the  enactivist’s  stress  on  biological
frugality, satisficing, and the ubiquity of simple
but adequate solutions that make the most of
brain, body, and world. At this point, all  the
positive  enactivist  cheques  mentioned  above
have been cashed. 
But  one  outstanding  debt  remains.  To
broker real and lasting peace, we must tiptoe
bravely  back  into  some muddy and contested
territory: the smoking battleground of the Rep-
resentation wars. 
3 Representations: What are they good 
for?
PP, Madary suggests,  provides a new kind of
lever for naturalizing intentionality and mental
content. Might it also offer a new perspective
upon the vexed topic of internal representation?
Varela et al. are explicit that, on the enactivist
conception “cognition is no longer seen as prob-
lem  solving  on  the  basis  of  representations”
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(1991, p. 205). PP, however, deals extensively in
internal models – models that may (see  Clark
this collection) be rich, frugal, and all points in-
between. The role of such models is to control
action by predicting and bringing about com-
plex plays of sensory data. This, the enactivist
might fear, is where our promising story about
neural processing goes conceptually astray. Why
not simply ditch the talk of inner models and
internal  representations  and  stay  on  the  true
path of enactivist virtue?
This  issue  requires  a  lot  more  discussion
than I  can attempt here.4 Nonetheless,  the re-
maining distance between PP and the enactivist
may not be as great as that bald opposition sug-
gests. We can begin by reminding ourselves that
PP, although it  openly  trades in  talk of  inner
models  and  representations,  invokes  representa-
tions  that  are  action-oriented  through  and
through. These are representations that are fun-
damentally in the business of serving up actions
within the context of rolling sensorimotor cycles.
Such  representations  aim to  engage the  world,
rather than to depict it in some action-neutral
fashion, and they are firmly rooted in the history
of organism-environment interactions that served
up  the  sensory  stimulations  that  installed  the
probabilistic generative model. What is on offer is
thus just about maximally distant from a passive
(“mirror of nature” – see Rorty 1979) story about
the possible fit between model and world. For the
test of a good model is how well it enables the or-
ganism to engage the world in a rolling cycle of
actions that maintain it within a window of viab-
ility. The better the engagements, the lower the
information-theoretic free energy (this is intuitive,
since more of the system’s resources are being put
to “effective work” in engaging the world). Pre-
diction  error  reports  this  information-theoretic
free energy, which is mathematically constructed
so as always to be greater than “surprisal” (where
this names the sub-personally computed implaus-
ibility of some sensory state given a model of the
world – see  Tribus 1961). Notice also that the
prediction  task  uses  only  information  clearly
4 I  have  engaged  such  arguments  at  length  elsewhere  –  see  Clark
(1989,  1997,  2008,  2012). For sustained arguments  against the ex-
planatory  appeal  to  internal  representation,  see  Ramsey (2007),
Chemero (2009),  Hutto & Myin (2013). For some useful discussion,
see Sprevak (2010, 2013), Gallagher et al. (2013).
available  to  the  organism,  and  is  ultimately
defined over the energies that impinge on the or-
ganism’s  sensory surfaces.  But finding the best
ways to predict those energetic impacts can (as
substantial  bodies  of  work in  machine learning
amply demonstrate5) yield a structured grip upon
a world of interacting causes. 
This notion of a  structured  grip is import-
ant. Early connectionist networks were famously
challenged (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988) by the need
to deal with structure – they were unable to cap-
ture  part-whole  hierarchies,  or  complex  nested
structures in which larger wholes embed smaller
components,  each of  which may itself  be some
kind  of  structured  entity.  For  example,  a  city
scene may consist of a street populated by shops
and cars and people, each of which is also a struc-
tured whole in its own right. Classical approaches
benefitted from an easy way of dealing with such
issues.  There,  digital  objects  (symbol  strings)
could  be  composed  of  other  symbols,  and
equipped with pointers to further bodies of in-
formation. This apparatus was (and remains) ex-
tremely biologically suspect, but it enabled nest-
ing, sharing, and recombination on a grand scale
– see Hinton (1990) for discussion. Such systems
could  easily  capture  structured  (nested,  often
hierarchical)  relationships in a manner that al-
lowed for easy sharing and recombination of ele-
ments. But they proved brittle and inflexible in
other ways, failing to display fluid context-sensit-
ive responsiveness, and floundering when required
to  guide  behavior  in  time-pressured  real-world
settings.6 
Connectionist research has since spawned a
variety of methods – some more successful than
others - for dealing with structure in various do-
mains. At the same time, work in robotics and in
embodied and situated cognitive science has ex-
plored the many ways in which structure in the
environment (including the highly structured arti-
ficial environments of text and external symbol
systems) could be exploited so as to reap some of
the benefits associated with classical forms of in-
5 For reviews and discussions, see Bengio (2009), Huang & Rao (2011),
Hinton (2007), and Clark (in press).
6 For a sustained discussion of these failings, and the attractions of
connectionist (and post-connectionist) alternatives, see  Clark (1989,
1993,  2014),  Bechtel &  Abrahamsen (2002),  Pfeifer &  Bongard
(2007).
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ner encoding, without (it was hoped) the associ-
ated costs of biological implausibility – see, for ex-
ample,  Pfeifer &  Bongard (2007).  Perhaps  the
combination  of  a  few  technical  patches  and  a
much richer reliance upon the use of structured
external  resources  would  address  the  worries
about dealing with structure? Such was the hope
of many, myself included. 
On this project, the jury is still out. But PP
can embrace these insights and economies while
providing a more powerful overall solution. For it
offers  a  biologically  plausible  means,  consistent
(we saw) with as much reliance on external scaf-
folding as possible, of internally encoding and de-
ploying richly structured bodies  of  information.
This is because each PP level (perhaps these cor-
respond to  cortical  columns  –  this  is  an  open
question) treats activity at the level below as if it
were sensory data, and learns compressed meth-
ods to predict those unfolding patterns. This res-
ults in a very natural extraction of nested struc-
ture in the causes of the input signal, as different
levels  are progressively  exposed to different  re-
codings, and re-re-codings of the original sensory
information. These re-re-codings (I think of them
as  representational  re-descriptions  in  much  the
sense  of  Karmiloff-Smith 1992)  enable  us,  as
agents, to lock us onto worldly causes that are
ever more recondite, capturing regularities visible
only in patterns spread far in space and time.
Patterns  such  as  weather  fronts,  persons,  elec-
tions,  marriages,  promises,  and  soccer  games.
Such patterns are the stuff of which human lives,
and human mental lives, are made. What locks
the  agent on to these familiar patterns is, how-
ever,  the  whole  multi--level  processing  device
(sometimes, it is the whole machine in action).
That machine works (if  PP is correct) because
each level is driven to try to find a compressed
way to predict activity at the level below, all the
way out to the sensory peripheries. These nested
compressions, discovered and annealed in the fur-
nace of action, are what I (following Hinton 1990)
would like to call “internal representations”. 
What are the  contents  of the many states
governed by the resulting structured, multi-level,
action-oriented  probabilistic  generative  models?
The generative model issues predictions that es-
timate various identifiable worldly states (includ-
ing states of the body, and the mental states of
other agents).7 But it is also necessary, as we saw
in Clark (this collection) to estimate the context-
variable reliability (precision) of the neural estim-
ations themselves. It is  these precision-weighted
estimates that drive action, and it is action that
then samples the scene, delivering percepts that
select more actions. Such looping complexities ex-
acerbate an important consequence that Madary
nicely notes. They make it even harder (perhaps
impossible) adequately to capture the contents or
the cognitive roles of many key inner states and
processes using the terms and vocabulary of or-
dinary  daily  speech.  That  vocabulary  is  “de-
signed”  for  communication,  and  (perhaps)  for
various  forms  of  cognitive  self-stimulation  (see
Clark 2008). The probabilistic generative model,
by contrast, is designed to engage the world in
rolling, uncertainty-modulated, cycles of percep-
tion and action. Nonetheless, high-level states of
the generative model will  target large-scale,  in-
creasingly invariant patterns in space and time,
corresponding to (and allowing us to keep track
of)  specific  individuals,  properties,  and  events
despite  large  moment-by-moment  variations  in
the stream of sensory stimulation. Unpacked via
cascades  of  descending  prediction,  such  higher-
level states simultaneously inform both perception
and action, locking them into continuous circular
causal flows. Instead of simply describing “how
the  world  is”,  these  models  -  even  when  con-
sidered at those “higher” more abstract levels -
are geared to engaging those aspects of the world
that matter to us. They are delivering a grip on
the patterns that matter for the interactions that
matter. 
Could  we  perhaps  (especially  given  the
likely difficulties  in  specifying  intermediate-level
contents in natural-language terms) have told our
story  in  entirely  non-representational  terms,
without  invoking  the  concept  of  a  hierarchical
probabilistic generative model at all? One should
always beware of sweeping assertions about what
might, one day, be explanatorily possible! But as
things stand, I simply don’t see how this is to be
achieved. For it is surely that very model-invoking
7 Bayesian perceptual and sensorimotor psychology (see for example,
Rescorla 2013;  Körding &  Wolpert 2006) already has much to say
about just what worldly and bodily states these may be.
Clark, A. (2015). Predicting Peace: The End of the Representation Wars-A Reply to Michael Madary.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 7(R). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570979 5 | 7
www.open-mind.net
schema that allows us to understand how it is
that these looping dynamical regimes arise and
enable such spectacular results. The regimes arise
and  succeed  because  the  system  self-organizes
around prediction-error so as to capture organ-
ism-salient patterns, at various scales of space and
time, in the (partially self-created) input stream.
These  patterns  specify  complex,  inter-animated
structures of bodily and worldly causes. Subtract
this guiding vision and what remains is just the
picture  of  complex  looping  dynamics  spanning
brain,  body,  and  world.  Consider  those  same
looping dynamics from the multi-level model-in-
voking explanatory perspective afforded by PP,
however,  and  many  things  fall  naturally  into
place. We see how statistically-driven learning can
unearth interacting distal  and bodily causes  in
the first place, revealing a structured world of hu-
man-sized opportunities for action; we see why,
and exactly how, perception and action can be
co-constructed  and co-determining;  and we un-
ravel  the  precise  (and  happily  un-mysterious)
sense in which organisms may be said to bring
forth their worlds. 
4 Predicting peace: An end to the war 
over internal representation
Dynamically speaking, the whole embodied, act-
ive system here self-organizes around the organis-
mically-computable  quantity  “prediction  error”.
This is what delivers that multi-level, multi-area,
grip on the evolving sensory barrage – a grip that
must span multiple spatial and temporal scales.
Such a grip simultaneously determines perception
and action,  and it  selects  (enacts)  the ongoing
stream of sensory bombardment itself. The gener-
ative model that here issues sensory predictions is
thus  nothing  but  that  multi-level,  multi-area8,
multi-scale, body-and-action involving grip on the
unfolding sensory stream. To achieve that grip is
8 The point about multiple areas (not just multiple levels within areas) is
important, but it is often overlooked in philosophical discussions of pre-
dictive processing. Different neural areas are best-suited – by location,
inputs, structure, and/or cell-type - to different kinds of prediction. So
the same overarching PP strategy will yield a complex economy in which
higher-levels predict lower levels, but different areas learn to trade in
very different kinds of prediction. This adds great dynamical complexity
to the picture, and requires some means for sculpting the flow of inform-
ation among areas. I touch on these issue in Clark (this collection). But
for a much fuller exploration, see Clark (in press). 
to  know  the  structured  and  meaningful  world
that we encounter in experience and action. 
Is this an inner economy bloated with rep-
resentations, detached from the world? Not at all.
This is an inner economy geared for action, whose
inner states bear contents in virtue of the way
they lock embodied agents onto properties and
features of their worlds. But it is simultaneously a
structured  economy  built  of  nested  systems,
whose communal project is both to model and en-
gage the (organism-relative) world.
References
Bechtel,  W.  & Abrahamsen,  A.  (2002).  Connectionism
and the mind: Parallel processing, dynamics, and evol-
ution in networks. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. 
Bengio,  Y.  (2009).  Learning  deep  architectures  for  AI.
Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning, 2 (1), 1-
127. 10.1561/2200000006
Chemero, A. (2009).  Radical embodied cognitive science.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Clark,  A.  (1989).  Microcognition:  Philosophy,  cognitive
science and parallel distributed processing.  Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press. 
 (1993).  Associative engines: Connectionism, con-
cepts  and  representational  change.  Cambridge,  MA:
MIT Press. 
 (1997). Being there: Putting brain, body and world
together again. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 (2008). Supersizing the mind: Action, embodiment,
and cognitive extension.  New York, NY: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
 (2012). Dreaming the whole cat: Generative mod-
els, predictive processing, and the enactivist conception
of  perceptual  experience.  Mind,  121 (483),  753-771.
10.1093/mind/fzs106.
 (2014).  Mindware: An introduction to the philo-
sophy of cognitive science. New York, NY: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
 (2015). Embodied prediction. In T. Metzinger &
J.  M.  Windt  (Eds.)  Open  MIND.  Frankfurt  a.  M.,
GER: MIND Group. 
Clark, A. (in press).  Surfing uncertainty: Prediction, ac-
tion, and the embodied mind.  New York, NY: Oxford
University Press. 
Fodor, J. & Pylyshyn, Z. (1988). Connectionism and cog-
nitive  architecture:  A critical  analysis.  Cognition,  28
(1-2), 3-71. 10.1016/0010-0277(88)90031-5
Clark, A. (2015). Predicting Peace: The End of the Representation Wars-A Reply to Michael Madary.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 7(R). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570979 6 | 7
www.open-mind.net
Friston, K., Adams, R. & Montague, R. (2012). What is
value—Accumulated reward or evidence?  Frontiers in
Neurorobotics, 6. 10.3389/fnbot.2012.00011
Froese, T. & Di Paolo, E. A. (2011). The enactive ap-
proach: Theoretical sketches from cell to society. Prag-
matics and Cognition, 19 (1), 1-36. 10.1075/pc.19.1.01-
fro
Gallagher, S., Hutto, D., Slaby, J. & Cole, J. (2013). The
brain as  part of  an enactive system.  Behavioral  and
Brain  Sciences,  36 (4),  421-422.
10.1017/S0140525X12002105
Hinton,  G.  E.  (1990).  Mapping  part-whole  hierarchies
into connectionist  networks.  Artificial Intelligence,  46
(1-2), 47-75. 10.1016/0004-3702(90)90004-J
 (2007). Learning multiple layers of representation.
Trends  in  Cognitive  Sciences,  11 (10),  428-434.
10.1016/j.tics.2007.09.004
Huang, Y. & Rao, R. (2011). Predictive coding.  Wiley
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 2 (5), 580-
593. 10.1002/wcs.142
Hutto, D. D. & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing enactivism: Ba-
sic minds without content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond modularity: A devel-
opmental perspective on cognitive science.  Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books. 
Körding, K. & Wolpert, D. (2006). Bayesian decision the-
ory in sensorimotor control.  Trends in Cognitive Sci-
ences, 10 (7), 319-326. 0.1016/j.tics.2006.05.003
Madary, M. (2015). Extending the explanandum for pre-
dictive processing - A commentary on Andy Clark. In
T.  Metzinger  &  J.  M.  Windt  (Eds.)  Open  MIND.
Frankfurt a. M., GER: MIND Group. 
Noë,  A. (2004).  Action in perception.  Cambridge,  MA:
MIT Press. 
 (2010).  Out of our heads: Why you are not your
brain, and other lessons from the biology of conscious-
ness. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
 (2015). Concept pluralism, direct perception, and
the  fragility  of  presence.  In  T.  Metzinger  &  J.  M.
Windt  (Eds.)  Open  MIND.  Frankfurt  a.  M.,  GER:
MIND Group. 
Pfeifer, R. & Bongard, J. (2007). How the body shapes the
way we think: A new view of intelligence.  Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press. 
Ramsey,  W.  M.  (2007).  Representation  reconsidered.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Rescorla, M. (2013). Bayesian perceptual psychology. Ox-
ford handbook of  the philosophy of  perception (forth-
coming). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Rorty, R. (1979).  Philosophy and the mirror of nature.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Simon, H. A. (1956). Rational choice and the structure of
the environment. Psychological Review, 63 (2), 129-138.
10.1037/h0042769
Sprevak, M. (2010). Computation, individuation, and the
received view on representation. Studies in History and
Philosophy  of  Science,  41 (3),  260-270.
10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.07.008
 (2013). Fictionalism about neural representations.
The Monist, 96 (4), 539-560. 10.5840/monist201396425
Stewart, J., Gapenne, O. & Di Paolo, E. (Eds.) (2010).
Enaction: Towards a new paradigm for cognitive sci-
ence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Thompson, E. (2010). Mind in life: Biology, phenomeno-
logy, and the sciences of mind.  Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press. 
Tribus,  M.  (1961).  Thermodynamics  and thermostatics:
An introduction to energy, information and states of
matter, with engineering applications.  New York, NY:
D. Van Nostrand Company Inc. 
Varela, F., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. (1991).  The em-
bodied mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Clark, A. (2015). Predicting Peace: The End of the Representation Wars-A Reply to Michael Madary.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 7(R). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570979 7 | 7
